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Religious Knowledge1
John Hawthorne
Let me distinguish two sorts of epistemological projects that might be under-
taken by someone with religious commitments. The first – roughly an evangelical 
project – is that of trying to get other people who do not currently share those 
commitments to come around to one’s point of view. I am not interested in that 
project here. A second project is rather more solipsistic. It is that of resisting 
internal pressures to admit that even by one’s own lights, it is overwhelmingly 
unlikely that one’s religious commitments are rational and overwhelmingly 
unlikely that one’s religious commitments constitute pieces of knowledge. The 
project here is not that of convincing others – it is that of keeping the epistemo-
logical wolves at bay. 
The second project is an altogether worthy one. There, is after all, something 
very uncomfortable about being in the situation where one maintains an un-
qualified commitment to some proposition P but is also committed to either the 
proposition that one doesn’t know P or to the proposition that one is irrational to 
believe P. Speeches of the form ‘P and I don’t know P’ and ‘P and I am irrational 
in believing P’ sound none too healthy, whether made to others or to oneself. 
Now perhaps there are some people who are so unreflective that they feel 
no internal pressure whatsoever towards denying that their religious beliefs are 
rational/pieces of knowledge. These wide eyed individuals claim to know this 
or that but have thought very little about what it takes to know, and about what 
sorts of situations provide hostile environments for knowledge. They will feel 
no need to bring the second project to a satisfactory conclusion. This paper is 
not directed at them.
I shall be looking briefly at two strategies by which religious believers might 
attempt to ward off pressures towards a negative epistemological self-assessment. 
Both are fairly well known. The first is a ‘fine-tuning’ strategy, wherein certain 
empirical claims about fine-tuning are used to justify claims to the effect that 
high credence in theism is rational. The second is a ‘trust’ strategy, which relies 
on the claim that a belief that P that flows from trust in an authority who knows 
that P itself constitutes knowledge, whether or not there are proximate mislead-
ing authorities, and whether or not the relevant authority also communicates 
falsehoods.
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(1) Fine-tuning
Prima facie, it seems pretty clear that whereas the best scientific theories of, 
say, the fourteenth century, provided a very friendly environment for religious 
belief, current scientific theory provides a rather unfriendly environment. Six 
or seven centuries ago there were all sorts of features of physics and cosmology 
that were most encouraging to the religious believer. Aristotelian philosophy of 
motion told us that bodies ran out of steam unless they were given fresh impetus. 
This led naturally to the thought that the universe as a whole would be running 
out of steam unless it was continually being given impetus from the outside. 
(Note that this ‘first cause’ argument does not require that the universe had a 
beginning. An eternal universe would hardly alleviate the need for motion to 
be inputted from the outside as a means to keeping the cosmological wheels in 
motion.) Meanwhile, Ptolemaic astronomy told us that we were literally at the 
centre of things, a fact that would seem strange and inexplicable from the per-
spective of a barren atoms-in-the void minimalism. And Aristotelian metaphysics 
of nature told us that the development of things was to be explained in terms 
of their principle of flourishing – their substantial form – and could not be 
explained by their material make up. This perspective reinforced the priority of 
teleological over mechanical explanation. These and many of the other sources 
of encouragement for religious belief that were available back then have by now 
evaporated. Current scientific theory seems to provide no encouragement what-
soever to the religious believer. 
Now one reaction that the religious believer might have to this is a don’t 
care attitude – we shall look at one version of this in the next section. Another 
reaction is that of trying to find subtle grounds for encouragement in current 
scientific theory, claiming that, under close scrutiny, science continues to provide 
a very friendly environment for religious belief. The best known version of this 
response is the fine-tuning strategy to which I now turn.2
The strategy I have in mind relies on an empirical springboard which I shall 
not question. This key empirical claim is that for an important range of funda-
mental physical constants c (Planck’s constant, for example), something like the 
following is true: 
Only an extremely restricted range of values for c permit the 
existence of living conscious beings. 
(The key bit of empirical reasoning demonstrates that for any of a myriad range 
of settings for this or that constant, those settings would make it impossible for 
large stable physical objects to emerge out of the cosmological soup.)
The line of thought then proceeds by claiming that the fact that the actual 
  3
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world’s constants are set at c provides a compelling reason for preferring the 
hypothesis that the creation of the universe was manipulated by a being who 
was interested in the emergence of living conscious beings over the hypothesis 
that the universe has no manipulator. 
The line of thought can be made vivid by the following analogy. Suppose I 
am presented with two buckets of pills. One bucket is the benevolent bucket – it 
contains pills that put me to sleep for a week after which I wake up refreshed. 
Another bucket is the risky bucket. It contains a few pills of the sort contained 
in the benevolent bucket, but the rest of the pills make me unconscious for ever. 
Suppose I have no idea which bucket is which. I take a pill from a bucket. At that 
point I have no view as to whether I have taken a pill from the benevolent bucket 
or not. But suppose at some point I find myself waking up (memory intact). At 
that point I clearly have excellent reason to believe that I have taken a pill from 
the benevolent bucket. Let a pill represent a setting of the universe’s constants, 
where a waking pill represents a setting for the constants that allows for conscious 
beings and an unconsciousness pill represents one that does not. The benevolent 
bucket represents the hypothesis of a consciousness-desiring manipulator, since 
such a manipulator would always ensure conscious-friendly constants, while the 
risky bucket represents the hypothesis of a blind universe. Meanwhile, the fact 
of waking up represents our living conscious existence. Just as in the scenario 
described I give high credence on waking up to the claim that I have taken a pill 
from the benevolent bucket, so I am supposed to give high credence to theism 
on taking cognizance of the relationship of constants to consciousness in tandem 
with my own conscious existence.
One kind of reaction to this kind of strategy is to contest the claim that the 
relevant empirical facts in combination with my own conscious existence pro-
vides evidence for theism. I think this is the wrong reaction. To make this vivid 
consider a much more silly example. Consider the hypothesis that the universe 
has been manipulated by a being whose main ambition is to produce a universe 
with large orange vegetable. Let us ask whether the existence of pumpkins is 
evidence for the existence of such a being. Well, let us ask what credences we 
ought to have had for the relevant hypothesis prior and posterior to noticing 
pumpkins. On standard ways of thinking about how probabilities are updated,3 
the probability assigned to the hypothesis would go up upon noticing pumpkins. 
To simplify, suppose we are 50/50 whether there are large orange vegetables in 
the world and think it one in two hundred billion that the world is manipulated 
by a being obsessed with large orange vegetables. When we discover there are 
pumpkins, then on standard ways of thinking about updating (and supposing 
there is no other relevant new evidence) we ought to be one in a hundred billion 
that there is such a being.
Think of someone’s pattern of credences as a pie, with the size of credence 
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in some proposition corresponding to the size of some associated piece (relative 
to the whole pie), where the piece representing credence in P is part of the piece 
representing credence in Q if and only if P entails Q. New evidence consists in 
knocking out certain pieces. Standard updating is tantamount to expanding the 
pieces that are left into a whole pie in a way that preserves the ratios between 
them. When we learn that there are large orange vegetables, we destroy half of 
the pie. When the remaining half is expanded to form a whole, the piece that 
used to constitute one two hundred billionth of the pie now constitutes one 
hundred billionth of it.
(If one wants a bucket analogy, imagine that there are billions of buckets, one 
of which is full of waking pills, the rest a mixture of pills, half of which lead to 
waking, half to permanent unconsciousness. One takes a pill, not knowing for 
certain which kind of bucket one is taking a pill from. When one wakes up, that 
provides a bit of evidence that one has taken a pill from the bucket full of waking 
pills, but one’s credence in that hypothesis remains extremely low.)
 The thought experiment encourages one to think that the existence of large 
orange vegetables is evidence for our bizarre supernatural hypothesis. But it hardly 
encourages one to think it is rational to assign high credence to that hypothesis. 
This points to the main shortcoming of the fine-tuning strategy. For that strategy 
focuses on the claim that consciousness plus fine-tuning provides evidence for 
theism but ignores the crucial issue, that of the appropriate prior probabilities. 
To get at this issue we might imagine a non-worldly being who was about to be 
thrust into the universe knowing nothing about it, though who already knows 
enough about the dependence of physical layout on physical law to know about 
the various dependences of this or that structure on this or that setting of con-
stants. What kinds of credences are appropriate for that being with regard to 
the hypothesis of a consciousness-obsessed manipulator? Certainly, the piece of 
pie corresponding to that credence will be entirely contained within the piece of 
pie corresponding to the credence in consciousness friendly constants. But the 
key issue is the appropriate ratio between the former piece and the latter piece. 
Suppose the proportion is rationally mandated to be very low. Then, when the 
being learns about consciousness friendly constants, its credence in a conscious-
ness-obsessed manipulator will go up but will remain very low. Presumably when 
that being has absorbed the facts about the presence of consciousness in the 
world it will be apprised of all the relevant information fine-tuning enthusiasts 
produce. So if its initial credences were more or less mandatory and its final as-
sessment of the consciousness friendly manipulator hypothesis is low then unless 
the fine-tuning enthusiast has additional evidence, his or her final assessment 
ought to be low as well.
Of course none of this requires the fine-tuning enthusiast to be destabilized. 
If he or she honestly thinks that the being I described should, prior to entering 
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the physical universe, proportion her pie in a way that allows most of the piece 
corresponding to consciousness friendly constants to be taken up by the piece 
corresponding to a consciousness friendly manipulator, then she will think ra-
tional high credence in such a manipulator explicable by the facts about rational 
initial outlooks in combination with the facts of fine-tuning.4 The trouble is that 
in my experience there are not many reflective individuals – including reflective 
religious individuals – who honestly think that it is appropriate for the being to 
do this unless he or she had additional evidence ready to hand. These individu-
als will not bring themselves epistemological peace by reflecting on the facts of 
fine-tuning. 
 
        (2) Trust
In some circles, there is a use of the term “faith” wherein it is contrasted with 
knowledge. But as it was used in scholastic circles, the term implied no such 
contrast. As a pretty good first pass, the insight driving doctrines about faith was 
that knowledge flowed to individuals who had faith in knowledgeable authorities. 
To what extent can the religious intellectual use that insight to ward off negative 
epistemological self-assessment? I’d like to divide our topic into two subtopics. 
First, let us ask whether the following principles are true
Transfer
If x knows that y asserts P and x comes to believe P by trusting y with respect 
to P, and y knows P, then x comes to know P. 
Maintenance
If x knows P by trusting y and continues to believe P on that basis, then, 
whatever else happens, x continues to know P. 
There are various cases which some people no doubt will take as fairly decisive 
counterexamples to these principles. I am yet to be convinced that any such cases 
are in fact decisive. One style of case is one where a knowing subject tells one the 
truth but there are deceivers lurking nearby who one wouldn’t recognize as such. 
One might think that this is analogous to seeing a real barn in an environment 
filled with barn facades – where received wisdom has it that one does not know 
that one is seeing a barn.5 This kind of case doesn’t move me much. Suppose I 
ask someone the time. The person knows the time and tells me. Suppose there 
are other people in the room who would lie to me. Is it really so clear here that 
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I do not know the time? I am lucky in a sense, admittedly. But the question is 
whether it is the kind of luck that is incompatible with knowledge, or instead 
merely a case where I am lucky enough to get the opportunity to acquire knowl-
edge.  One can’t adjudicate between these diagnoses simply by throwing around 
the term ‘luck’.
Another kind of case is one where x knows P, doesn’t know Q, tells y both P 
and Q and y comes to believe P and Q. Here we are invited to conclude that y 
knows neither P nor Q. This case is also less than convincing. Suppose someone 
reads the sports results in a paper and believes all that he reads. Suppose there 
is a misprint regarding the Manchester United result. Does that mean that the 
person doesn’t come to know the Liverpool result (suppose that the latter is not 
misprinted)? It is far from clear. Another kind of case is one where one is told 
by a knowing subject that P, and trusts that subject even though prior to being 
told P thinks it probable that if that subject says P that subject is lying. At least 
when described in this schematic way I am unconvinced by this ‘counterexample’ 
as well. Aren’t there cases where we would naturally say that someone came to 
their senses in trusting someone even though they previously were profoundly 
distrustful of them? In such a case we do not think that their previous profound 
distrust stopped them knowing when they did trust. (And of course once they did 
come to know P on that basis then it was no longer likely on their evidence that 
the person was deceptive about P). Another kind of case is one where I come to 
know P by testimony but then get misleading evidence that the testimony is faulty, 
the idea being that this automatically destroys knowledge. Here again matters are 
not clear. Suppose a parent knows P, tells a child P and then all sorts of people 
tell the child that the parents have messed up, but the child sticks to his guns in 
believing P. Is it really so clear that the child stops knowing P?
We seem to have a situation of mixed intuitions about cases on the one hand 
and a pair of fairly elegant principles that seem to capture part of the important 
architecture of knowledge on the other. In such cases we should be wary about 
complicating the principle in response to scattered intuitions about cases. No 
doubt many philosophers will think that I am forgetting all the epistemological 
work on defeaters, work driven by the idea that beliefs that I acquire may defeat 
a particular belief’s claim to knowledge even though it was previously a bit of 
knowledge. But as far as I can see, much of that work is of such tragically poor 
quality that it is not at all clear what can be learnt from it. (Certainly the fact 
that I believe something incompatible with P does not stop my belief that P be-
ing knowledge. I may, for example, retain the incompatible belief only because 
I have not done internal housecleaning yet.) Despite the protestations of such 
philosophers, then, I will proceed on the assumption that Transfer and Main-
tenance are true. Let us now turn to the question of how self-assessment might 
proceed in that light.
7
Hawthorne: Religious Knowledge
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2007
6 x 9
Religious Knowledge    11
 The following analogy will suffice for conveying the main points that I wish 
to make. Suppose we live in a post-apocalyptic era and the human race is dying 
out. One group of us decides to leave a library full of important information 
about our species and its history. Another devious group decides to leave a 
library packed with false information. We die out and centuries later Martians 
come and settle on earth. One group settles in the vicinity of the false library. 
Another group settles in the vicinity of the true library. Each trusts the books 
that they read and forms and maintains beliefs on that basis. Assuming Trust and 
Maintenance are correct, the group that reads the true library comes to know its 
contents. Relatedly, they come to know that the books that they are reading are 
true. After all, suppose they read a book that says P, recognize that it says P and 
come to know P by trusting the book. They know that P and that the book says 
P, so insofar as they do not know this already can come to know that the book 
truly says P by a simple deduction (I assume here the plausible closure principle 
that deductions from known premises produce knowledge.) Do they know that 
they know propositions learnt from the book? What I have said doesn’t settle 
that. But we can well imagine that the people who wrote the book knew the truth 
of the Transfer and Maintenance principles and so, for various propositions that 
they knew that they knew, coupled the claim that P with the claim ‘If a reader 
of this book comes to believe P by trusting this book, then that person thereby 
comes to know P’ (call this conditional C). The Martians reading the true book 
read P, come to believe P and come to know that by trusting the book they came 
to believe P. They also come to know C by trusting the book. This all puts them 
in a position, for very many values of P, not only to know P (by reading P in the 
book), but to know that they know P (by putting together the conditional in the 
book with other things that they know).
Suppose the Martians who had read the true library met up with the Martians 
who had read the false library and noticed the discrepancies. Let us imagine each 
group divided into two kinds of psychological profiles. There were those who 
got nervous when the discrepancy showed up and became agnostic about both 
libraries. And there were those who stuck to their guns. Assuming Transfer and 
Maintenance, the Martians who read the true library and stuck to their guns 
continue to know its contents and, for very many values of P, continue to know 
that they know its contents. Would those Martians be able to know that the 
Martians who were sticking to their guns from the other library were making a 
mistake? Assuming Transfer and Maintenance the answer is obviously ‘yes’. For 
various values of P, they would know P, know the other Martians were claiming 
that not-P and then deduce that the Martians were making a mistake. Now of 
course the Martians who stuck to their guns with the true library would likely 
be utterly unsuccessful in any evangelical project with regard to those who stuck 
to their guns with the false library. But we can imagine that this does not shake 
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them. They realize that there are lots of cases where one has the information 
that P, but there is no way of sharing that information with someone because he 
or she is not trusting. (Suppose I remember that Janet came into the room first 
and you misremember it was John. If you don’t trust me and stick to your guns 
I can’t help you epistemologically, but that won’t necessarily trouble me.)
Will the Martians who stick to their guns be in a position to recognize any 
flaws in themselves? What I have said so far might suggest that the Martians 
who read the good library are not flawed in any way. But I do not at all mean 
to imply that. A Martian who trusted the good library would recognize that he 
was psychologically so constituted that if he had first read a coherent but false 
library he would have trusted that library instead.6 He will thus recognize that he 
is someone with a psychological constitution that could very easily have disastrous 
consequences. Now this recognition need not, as a causal matter, induce any 
kind of instability, or loss of faith. After all the stick-to-their guns Martians might 
be so constituted as to be utterly unmoved in their convictions by a recognition 
that those convictions were produced by mechanisms that (individuated by their 
internal operations) could very easily have lead to disaster.
Suppose we were to ask stick-to-your guns Martians: “Doesn’t the fact that 
those mechanisms could so easily have led to disaster show that your beliefs are 
not actually knowledge?” We might imagine them replying that in the sense rel-
evant to knowledge, a belief formed by trust in a knowing authority is produced 
by a method different from a belief formed by trust in a false authority, and the 
fact that a different method could easily have generated a false belief does not 
epistemologically indict the relevant actual beliefs. They might point out, by way 
of analogy, that even if dreaming consisted in visual processing that internally 
duplicated veridical processing and even if it produced real beliefs, the fact of 
dreaming would not prevent beings from knowing their surroundings when 
they were awake.
What of the facts about likelihood? Suppose we were to say to a dogmatic 
Martian: “Wouldn’t you concede that it is at least quite unlikely that your inter-
nal mechanism is delivering knowledge that P (for some disputed P)?” We could 
well imagine the Martian being careful to distinguish questions of objective and 
epistemic probability. “When I was born it was perhaps objectively unlikely that I 
would come by the knowledge that I have. But that doesn’t trouble me any more 
than that it was objectively unlikely when I was born that I would be standing 
on this spot right now (assuming that the world is chancy). Turning to epistemic 
probability. Is it epistemically probable that I know P? In general, if someone 
knows Q, then Q is epistemically highly probable for them. But assuming that 
I know that I know P, it is epistemically highly probable that I know P. Since I 
am unwilling to deny that I know that I know P, I am unwilling to concede it is 
epistemically improbable that I know P. Of course my opponents will see things 
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differently. But I am not interested in evangelism.”
 Now it seems to me that the stick-to-their guns Martians who trust the good 
library will achieve a kind of inner epistemological stability that keeps their knowl-
edge in place, albeit one that will be alien to those so constituted as to be made 
nervous. But there will also be something quite sinister about the mechanism 
by which they accomplish this, something that can be recognized even by those 
who dogmatically trust in the good library. For such Martians will recognize that 
the very mechanisms that deliver them with stable knowledge could also easily 
generate benighted belief systems, perhaps even ones that induce Martians to 
destroy each other and themselves, generating ignorant Martians impervious 
to argument and criticism on account of internal facsimiles of the mechanisms 
that provide the original Martians with stable knowledge of the world. These 
mechanisms will do this not at distant possible worlds, but at the world in which 
they live. If Transfer and Maintenance are correct, then we can recognize that a 
mechanism can be both deeply flawed and dangerous in this way and also be a 
conduit to knowledge. The Martians who have read the good library might make 
this particularly vivid to themselves in the following way. They could imagine 
themselves given a choice between creating a race of beings after their own image, 
with mechanisms rather like themselves or, instead, a race of beings made after 
the fashion of the more nervous subgroup of Martians. (They would not be able 
to control the roamings of such beings, so they would know in advance that some 
would be exposed to false informants, some to true informants.) Insofar as the 
dogmatic Martians had a choice about which kind of beings to create (without 
having subsequent control over them), we could well imagine that they would 
choose the mechanisms of the nervous Martians. Of course, this choice would 
depend on further judgments: if they judged that the value accruing to certain 
bits of knowledge generated by the dogmatic mechanism outweighed the chaos 
resulting from the inevitable negative performances of that mechanism, then 
they would still prefer a dogmatic mechanism to a nervous one.
Achieving epistemological stability is one thing. Thinking of one’s internal 
mechanisms as a good prototype for an epistemological engine factory is quite 
another. While it may not induce internal epistemological turmoil, it is at least 
somewhat tragic were one to come to think of one’s internal mechanisms as 
a disastrously unwise prototype for the factory. And even if one valued one’s 
knowledge so much that one thought of one’s internal mechanisms as an all 
things considered desirable prototype, it remains somewhat tragic that an all 
things considered desirable prototype would inevitably wreak so much irremedi-
able havoc for so many of its manifestations.
University of Oxford
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1 Very little in this essay is original. The material under ‘fine-tuning’ articulates 
points that I have picked up in conversation with Frank Arntzenius and (espe-
cially) David Manley, and much of the material under ‘Trust’ stems from con-
versations with Maria Lasonen and Timothy Williamson. (Not that any of them 
would approve of the particular spin that I have given to various points.)
2 For further discussion see Paul Davies, The Accidental Universe, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, Richard Swinburne, ‘Argument from the fine-tuning of 
the universe,’ in J. Leslie, ed., Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, Macmillan, New 
York, 1990, p. 154-173.
3 I have the standard Bayesian approach in mind
4 She will be similarly undisturbed if she thinks that a variety of initial credences 
are rationally permissible for that being, and that certain rationally permissible 
initial credences are weighted in the manipulator-friendly way. 
5 See Alvin Goldman, ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ Journal of 
Philosophy, November 1976. For further discussion, See Hawthorne and Gen-
dler, ‘The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic 
Enemies,’ Philosophical Studies, June 2005.
6 He wouldn’t put this point by saying that he is so constituted that the order of 
his evidence makes a difference to where he ends up. He will think that a case in 
which he read the false library first is a case where certain bits of evidence – for 
example that P – where P is something he learnt from the true library, would 
never have been acquired.
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